

Message Text

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TAGS: PARM, UR, US, OEXD

SUBJ: NUCLEAR TEST BAN TECHNICAL TALKS: JUNE 19

PLENARY

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. IFFT AND TIMERBAEV CHAIRED MEETING. NO TECHNICAL DATA ON GEOLOGY OR YIELD CALIBRATION PRESENTED BY SOVIETS. TIMERBAEV SAID US ARGUMENTS AGAINST QUOTA WERE UNCONVINCING AND REAFFIRMED SOVIET VIEW OF IMPORTANCE OF QUOTA, WHICH WOULD SERVE TO LIMIT AGGREGATE YIELD OF EXPLOSIONS. SAFRONOV SAID EXISTING US AND USSR NATIONAL SYSTEMS CAN MONITOR WIDE SPECTRUM OF YIELDS AT TEST SITES DOWN TO A FEW KILOTONS. WITH 4-10 STATIONS HAVING ADEQUATE SIGNAL-TO-NOISE RATIO, EXPLOSIONS CAN BE LOCALIZED WITHIN HJEST SITES AND YIELDS DETERMINED TO WITHIN A FACTOR OF TWO IF ROUGH INFORMATION ON MEDIA AT TEST SITE IS AVAILABLE. IFFT PRESSED SOVIETS TO DESIGNATE, AND GIVE SPECIFICATIONS OF, THEIR TEST SITES AND SAID THAT FOR BOTH EXISTING AND POSSIBLE FUTURE TEST SITES THERE SHOULD BE CAREFUL SPECIFICATION OF LOCATIONS, BOUNDARIES AND TECHNICAL DATA. ROMNEY PRESENTED SOME KEY ELEMENTS OF TECHNICAL DATA REQUIRED TO HELP VERIFY YIELD THRESHOLD. IFFT NOTED THAT ROMNEY'S REMARKS WERE NOT A FORMAL PROPOSAL, BUT DESIGNED TO STIMULATE DISCUSSION. OSIN ASKED WHAT US ESTIMATE OF YIELD UNCERTAINTY WOULD BE IF INFORMATION DESCRIBED BY ROMNEY WERE AVAILABLE. HE ALSO ASKED IF US IS READY TO PROVIDE DATA DESCRIBED BY ROMNEY ON US

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TEST SITES. TO ENSURE THERE WAS NO MISUNDERSTANDING

IFFT STRESSED THAT THE US DOES NOT CONSIDER LOWER THRESHOLD OR QUOTA BELOW A THRESHOLD AS ACCEPTABLE.
END SUMMARY.

2. IN ABSENCE OF STOESSEL AND MOROKHOV, IFFT AND TIMERBAEV CHAIRED. TIMERBAEV REAFFIRMED IMPORTANCE ATTACHED BY SOVIETS TO THEIR QUOTA PROPOSAL, STATING THAT US ARGUMENTS THAT QUOTA WOULD NOT SIGNIFICANTLY LIMIT TESTING BECAUSE OF POSSIBILITY OF SIMULTANEOUS TESTS ARE UNCONVINCING. HE ARGUED THAT SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD BE AN EFFECTIVE WAY TO CURB ARMS AND WITHOUT A QUOTA THERE WOULD BE VIRTUALLY NO LIMITS ON RATE OF EXPERIMENTATION OR ON AGGREGATE YIELD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. HE SAID THERE SEEMS TO BE NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SIDES ON THE POSSIBILITY OF USING NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS TO VERIFY AGGREGATE YIELD OF NEAR-SIMULTANEOUS EXPLOSIONS. HE STATED THAT DURING THE DISCUSSIONS A DETAILED EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND INFORMATION HAD ALREADY TAKEN PLACE ON MANY SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS AND THIS WILL CONTINUE. TIMERBAEV STATED THAT, TO AVOID MISINTERPRETATIONS, THE SIDES SHOULD SHOW RESTRAINT (IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION OBUKHOV SAID THIS MEANT USE OF RESTRAINT IN PUSHING AGAINST THE UPPER THRESHOLD).

3. SAFRONOV THEN GAVE BRIEF PRESENTATION SAYING THAT EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON DETECTION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS BY SEISMIC SYSTEMS SHOWS THAT NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF US AND USSR CAN ASSURE EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF TESTS OVER A WIDE SPECTRUM OF YIELDS. HE CLAIMED THAT MEASUREMENT AND PROPAGATION ERRORS IN DETERMINING YIELDS CAN BE VIRTUALLY ELIMINATED BY HAVING A SUFFICIENTLY LARGE NUMBER OF STATIONS AND LIMITING TEST SITES. EXISTING SEISMIC NETWORKS, INCLUDING STATIONS AND ARRAYS, PERMIT DETECTION WITH CONFIDENCE OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS AT TEST SITES DOWN TO YIELDS OF A FEW KILOTONS. (IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS SOVIET SEISMOLOGISTS INDICATED THIS MEANT A FEW KILOTONS IN HARD ROCK.) WITH 4-10 STATIONS HAVING S/N RATION OF 1.5-2, EXPLOSIONS CAN BE LOCATED WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF A TEST SITE AND YIELDS CAN BE DETERMINED WITHIN AN ERROR CONSISTENT WITH THE
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ERRORS DUE TO COUPLING AND THE DEPTH FACTOR. THEREFORE THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE IN CARRYING OUT VERIFICATION BASED ON A YIELD THRESHOLD IS TO DETERMINE THE FACTOR OF SCATTER IN YIELD, WHICH WILL NOT EXCEED 2 IF THERE IS ROUGH DATA ON MEDIUM AT THE SHOT POINT. BETTER DATA ON CONDITIONS AT THE TEST SITE WILL REDUCE VALUE OF THIS FACTOR.

4. IFFT RESTATED US VIEW THAT ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS MUST BE AT SPECIFIED TEST SITES, WITH BOUNDARIES OF SITES CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD AND WITH AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES ON TECHNICAL INFORMATION REGARDING EXPLOSIONS AND PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ROCKS AT TEST SITES. HE SAID THAT ANY NEW AREAS USED FOR TESTING IN THE FUTURE AFTER AN AGREEMENT HAD TAKEN EFFECT SHOULD BE AS CARE-T FULLY SPECIFIED WITH REGARD TO LOCATION, BOUNDARIES AND TECHNICAL DATA AS EXISTING TEST AREAS. HE STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF SOVIETS' NOW PROVIDING INFORMATION DESIGNATING SITES FOR NUCLEAR TESTING AND THEIR PHYSICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

5. ROMNEY OUTLINED SOME OF MAIN ELEMENTS OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION THAT SHOULD BE AVAILABLE TO FACILITATE VERIFICATION OF YIELD THRESHOLD (TEXT SENT SEPTTEL). IFFT NOTED THAT ROMNEY'S REMARKS DID NOT CONSTITUTE FORMAL US PROPOSAL ON DATA REQUIREMENTS, BUT WERE INTENDED TO STIMULATE A FREE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH SOVIETS.

6. OSIN ASKED WITH WHAT DEGREE OF PRECISION DOES US EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO DETERMINE YIELDS BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS IF THE INFORMATION ROMNEY REFERRED TO IS PROVIDED. OSIN ALSO ASKED ROMNEY IF AMERICAN SIDE IS IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE SUCH DATA ON ITS TEST SITES. QUESTIONS WERE TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT BY US SIDE.

7. GALITCH ASKED IF GEOLOGICAL DATA REQUESTED BY US SIDE COVERED THE WHOLE AREA OF TEST SITE. ROMNEY RESPONDED THAT INFORMATION IS NEEDED FOR ALL AREAS OF TEST SITES WHERE TESTS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT. GALITCH ASKED IF THIS TYPE OF INFORMATION SHOULD BE PROVIDED
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IN ADVANCE. IFFT SAID QUESTION WOULD BE CONSIDERED.

8. IFFT MADE CLEAR THAT US DOES NOT CONSIDER A LOW THRESHOLD OR A QUOTA BELOW A THRESHOLD ACCEPTABLE. HE THEN ENDED BY NOTING THAT A JOINT REPORT COVERING, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE EXCHANGE OF DATA REFERRED TO BY ROMNEY COULD BE A USEFUL PRODUCT OF THE TALKS.

9. NEXT MEETING FRIDAY AT 10:30 A.M.STOESSEL

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